

18 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL VANDENBERG:

SUBJECT: Suggestions on the problem of improving the research and analysis operation of CIG.

I. Assumptions. The suggestions which follow are based on two assumptions:

A. That those functions of an intelligence operation commonly termed the research and analysis functions are, by and large, best performed by a certain type of university person. I find it necessary to operate on this assumption because the university picture is the one I understand best, and because (more objectively) during my experience in R/A-OSS, university people proved themselves very well-equipped for the R/A job.

I do not wish to argue that any university faculty member is automatically a perfect candidate for the R/A type of work - many are incompetent professionally, many are hopelessly lacking in administrative talent and a feeling for personal relations, and worst of all - many are unadaptable to the peculiar and practical requirements of an intelligence operation. Nor do I wish to seem to argue that no one from business, the arts, or the armed services is suitable for the R/A type of work: there are plenty of people outside universities who have the very talents that universities try to cultivate in their students and faculties.

B. That most of the R/A type of functions are best performed by people who are experts in the so-called social sciences, i.e., economics, history, international law, international relations, geography, and sometimes even psychology or sociology.

I realize that some R/A functions which CIG is performing or must soon perform lie outside the social sciences: i.e., in pure science, engineering, etc. The recruitment of people in these latter fields presents a special problem, which I will not deal with in this note.

II. The Problem: How to build the substantive competence and professional prestige of CIG's research and analysis operation.

A. Substantive competence.

a. Substantive competence can be improved by a careful process of recruitment of the best people now students in graduate schools or low ranking members of university faculties:

Such people are becoming available. The universities cannot possibly absorb or continue to employ them all.

Many such people are looking for a method of putting themselves at the disposition of the Government as a patriotic service.

Such people will be attracted by Government salary rates.

b. A by-product of careful selection of the best junior and middle grade people will be the creation in CIG of a personnel bait for the senior experts:

Senior experts will like the chance to work with a good staff.

On the other hand, senior experts will not come to CIG if the first part of their job is cleaning out poor staff and replacing it.

c. From this it follows:

CIG recruitment among university personnel should, wherever possible, be conducted through or in consultation with the very senior experts it hopes to interest in its work.

CIG should take every precaution against recruitment of university people who do not have the full confidence of the senior experts. If these precautions are not taken, CIG is likely to lose the respect of the senior experts whose interest it is concerned to capture.

B. Prestige.

a. But a personnel policy which does not shoot higher than the recruitment of juniors, even though such people fall cleanly within the category of the "gifted amateur," is not in the short run calculated to endow CIG with the prestige it must have.

b. CIG must have its own corps of senior experts in order to:

Achieve appropriate standing in Washington.

Achieve appropriate standing in the professional circles which will inevitably be important as: recruiting grounds, training grounds, and even places to which long-term research may be farmed out on contract.

Act as men of wisdom (as opposed to knowledge) to guide and encourage the junior staff.

c. To obtain the services of senior experts is difficult for reasons well known to you. This, however, does not argue that CIG should discontinue its efforts to recruit such experts.

1. The recruitment policy re established experts should be based upon the following:

a. That the experts in the relevant social sciences in the twenty or so best universities (see Attachment A) should be informed of the nature and importance of CIG's work.

b. That the experts know the role they can play in CIG.

c. That the experts know the technical conditions of employment, i.e., salary scale, hours of work, leave allowances, opportunities for foreign assignments, nature and size of administrative duties, etc.

d. That the experts know the kind of staff they can expect to work with or be permitted to build up; the kind of raw (substantive) materials they can expect to work with; the audience they can expect to reach with their finished product; and the seriousness with which their finished product will be received at high levels of the government.

2. The implementation of a recruiting policy re established experts might follow some or all the following lines:

a. Set up a board of high grade professional consultants (possibly as a subcommittee of CIG's present civilian Advisory Board). This board should consist of the country's leaders in the relevant social sciences. (See Attachment B.) Some of them should be from the group which served in the Government during the war; some among those who did not. The group as a whole should represent as wide a geographical spread as possible.

In the event that distance to and from the Middle West, South, and West will prevent desirable men from coming to Washington for discussion, regional committees might be organized under a regional chairman who will call regional meetings at CIG's suggestion for the purpose of getting the word, from time to time, from a CIG representative or group of representatives on tour.

b. In consultation with this board of experts, CIG might farm out to universities certain long-term research functions.

Such a move is desirable for two reasons: (1) To keep CIG's name constantly before university graduate students and faculties,

(2) To relieve CIG of jobs which, though essential to the performance of its mission, clutter up its high power day-to-day work.

c. In consultation with this board of experts CIG can put the finger upon areas of the world which are of high importance to CIG's task but which are out of fashion in the universities.

For example, since there has been no large popular demand for studies or savvy on such areas as Scandinavia, Iberian Peninsula, the Balkans, New East, Africa, and a number of Far Eastern countries, universities have not urged students to specialize in these areas, for the reason that finding a job as specialist has been next to impossible. If CIG offered a market for this kind of area talent, the universities would quickly underwrite the appropriate course of study, and the leaders in the field would have CIG constantly in mind.

d. In consultation with this board of experts CIG might undertake a monthly news letter for circulation among the proper university people.

Such a letter could be: either a house organ covering such matters of CIG business as can be given out as: personnel additions, intelligence procurement achievements, new lines of work to be undertaken, new contacts made with learned institutions such as museums, libraries, universities, laboratories, etc.; or publication of actual substantive analyses of situations abroad which can be disclosed.

III. What results may be anticipated if the above suggestions are implemented.

A. Short run. I very much doubt if any of the senior experts I name in Attachment B could be recruited at once by CIG on a full-time basis. Some of them may well be interested in a consultancy on a once-a-week, fortnight, or month basis. On the other hand, they may be able to suggest other men of acknowledged professional standing who are available for full-time employment right now. They will certainly have some promising junior candidates.

Even though the recruitment of top professional staff must, in my opinion, be slow, it should be noted: (a) that considerable prestige goes with a good board of visiting consultants, and (b) that other intelligence outfits in town are as barren of such staff as CIG, and are probably being less effective than CIG in overcoming the situation.

B. Long run. Many of the things I have suggested are things I have long considered. I am convinced that the consistent implementation of these ideas over a five year stretch would not only change the face of any research and analysis operation in the Government, but would go far towards changing some essential

characteristics of university courses of study and habits of thought.

It is my belief that a Government agency which has a mission as important as CIC and a task as congenial to a large bracket of academic people has a combination of attractions which make success inevitable. But the passage of time is an almost unavoidable hazard.

IV. Conclusion. This being my conviction, I regard the best course of action to be one of enlightened and consistent public relations with the universities.

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2 Attachments -
A and B